I duction
The theory that international trade in goods and services increases efficiency and the long-run wealth of a nation is one of the most established in economics. However, the basic analytical idea driving the theory, comparative advantage, applies equally to international trade in labor as it does in goods and services (Freeman, 2006) . But international trade in labor, immigration or emigration, differs in one important way from goods and services trade: Goods and services that move across borders cannot vote, protest, riot, or otherwise impact the public policies of the countries they move to but immigr . Intro ants can.
Institutions are an important fundamental cause of economic development (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi: 2004) . As Adam Smith (Canaan, 1904) reportedly wrote, "Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice: all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things."
A growing empirical literature supports the importance of strong private property rights, a rule of law, and an environment of economic freedom for promoting long run growth (DeHaan et al., 2006) . While the literature on the impact of economic freedom on various social and economic outcomes is quite large (Hall and Lawson, 2013) , comparatively little work has tried to explain economic freedom as a dependent variable.
Thus, a question of growing importance is: What causes policies and institutions consistent with economic freedom to develop?
There is some evidence that economic freedom is enhanced by fiscal decentralization (Cassette and Paty, 2010) , more educated politicians (Dreher, et al., 2009) , and by the competitiveness of the political environment (Leonida, Patti and Navarra, 2007) . Djankov, et al. (2003a) , Djankov et al., (2003b), and Bjornskov (2010) examined the determinants of legal institutions consistent with the economic freedom. Finally, LaPorta et al. (1999) looked at the determinants of various other aspects of economic freedom such as marginal tax rates and government fiscal size and scope. This paper empirically examines how immigration impacts a region's policies and institutions. Do immigrants positively or negatively impact a country's economic freedom?
There is an enormous literature that investigates the impact of immigration on the welfare of the native born population. Kerr and Kerr's (2011) recent survey, like prior surveys (Friedberg and Hunt, 1995) , acknowledges conflicting empirical results in the literature, but finds the general consensus is that current levels of immigration bring small but positive increases in the overall income of the native born in recipient countries. There is some evidence of a negative impact on the least-skilled native-born workers who are direct substitutes for low-skilled immigrants but even in these cases the empirical magnitude is small (Kerr and Kerr 2011) . Regardless, the economic gains to the world economy, and the immigrants themselves, can be quite large (Clemens, 2011) .
Despite this literature studying the economic impact of immigrants on recipient countries, very little research has focused on how immigration can impact the institutional environment of recipient countries. Yet, the economic impact on the welfare of the native born of any change in the institutional environment caused by immigration could dwarf any gains from the international trade of labor.
What research has been conducted on the impact of immigration, or racial/ethnic heterogeneity more generally, has usually focused on the impact on the welfare state or provision of public goods. In each case, there are competing theoretical hypotheses and/or interpretations of the empirical studies of how immigration would impact economic freedom on these margins.
Welfare and other public assistance programs are typically more generous in recipient nations than immigrants' homelands. Borjas (1999) and others have argued that these welfare benefits can be magnets that attract immigrants. The obvious question is how might immigrants impact levels of taxation and the welfare and social spending programs of the recipient nations. 1 Immigrants tend to have incomes below the median resident of developed countries. One hypothesis is that welfare states in recipient nations will grow because immigrants will constitute a voting block (or social pressure group if not allowed to vote) that agitates for higher taxes and greater redistribution. An alternative hypothesis is that welfare states will shrink because the native born population will be less willing to have a large welfare state once many of the benefits are going to immigrants rather than the native-born population.
1 A separate and distinct question, on which there is a larger amount of research, is what is the fiscal impact of immigration given current tax and spending policies. On this point there is less consensus than on the impact of immigrants on the employment opportunities and wages of natives. The fiscal impact of immigration varies considerably depending on the country studied, characteristics of the immigrants, and model employed. In general though, if there is a consensus, it is that the net fiscal impact is small. See Kerr and Kerr (2011) for a survey. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that fractionalization and ethnic heterogeneity are the main reasons that the United States has a smaller welfare state than most Western European countries. The clear implication for this research is that if immigration leads to greater heterogeneity it should shrink welfare states. Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) provide a median voter model that relies on relative income position, rather than ethnic fractionalization, to predict that native-born tax payers will shift their preferences away from high-tax high-benefits to a higher degree than immigrants who join the pro-tax probenefits coalition at the bottom of the income distribution. They study 11 European countries from 1974 to 1992 and find that a higher share of low-education immigrants in the population leads to lower social transfers and lower rates of taxation on labor.
However, other scholarship disputes whether immigration reduces the size of the welfare state. Banting and Kymlicka (2006) point out that most of the evidence on fractionalization comes from sub-Saharan Africa and the United States. In the United States much of the fractionalization comes from African Americans whose ancestors were brought here as slaves rather than voluntary immigrants, while sub-Saharan Africa states are often very fragile. They argue that it is a mistake to extrapolate too much to the impact of voluntary immigration on welfare states as a result of this research.
Increased demand for public education is another way in which immigration might increase the size of government. Greer (1972) , Everheart (1977) , Butts (1978) , Meyer et al. (1979) , Ralph and Ruberson (1980) , and Bowles and Gintis (2011) all argue that immigration to the United States caused greater demand for public education, particularly from native-born Protestants, who wanted public schools to assimilate immigrant groups that came from Catholic backgrounds.
There is literature in sociology that finds that immigration increases people's perception of greater risk of unemployment (despite the consensus of the economics literature that there is no such effect) and that people favor a more generous social safety net as a result (Kunovich, 2004; Svallfors, 1997; Ervasti and Hjerm, 2012; Finseraas, 2008; Burgoon, Koster, and van Egmond ,2012) . 2 Brady and Finnigan (2013) Similarly Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) find a negative correlation in U.S. cities, metropolitan areas, and counties between ethnic fragmentation and shares of spending productive public goods such as trash pick-up, roads, sewers, and education. These findings could be interpreted as support for the view that the size of government will be smaller (and freedom higher) when there is greater fractionalization but they could also be interpreted to say that the public goods of the rule of law and security of property rights will be lower (and thus economic freedom lower) when there is greater fragmentation. 3 Potentially the largest impact that immigrants could have on the well-being of the native-born populations of recipient countries is through their impact on countries' institutional environments. This paper is the first to empirically examine the impact of immigration on a broad measure of economic freedom that has been shown to be associated with improved economic outcomes. The next section describes our data and methodology. Section III contains our results. The final section concludes.
I a and Methodology
We examine how the immigrant share of the population in 1990 impacts the level of economic freedom in that region in 2011. In all regressions we control for a region's initial level of economic freedom in 1990 in order to capture the complex long-run historical, cultural, economic, and other factors that influence a region's level of freedom but that can change only slowly and aren't individually well understood. Table 1 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of our data.
For each main freedom variable of interest we ran two regressions. In the first we looked at the overall percent of immigrants in the population. In the second we split immigrants by whether their country of origin was an OECD member or not in order to see if immigrants from poorer countries impact economic freedom differently than immigrants from richer countries.
Immigration may impact the degree of economic freedom granted by state or regional governments differently than it impacts the freedom at the national level. The Economic Freedom of North America index rates the economic freedom level of the 50 U.S.
states and 10 Canadian provinces/territories (Stansel and McMahon: 2013 
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Our main finding is that a larger percentage of immigrants in the population in 1990
is associated with a slightly higher level of economic freedom in 2011. See Table 2 .
Specifically in Regression 1, we find that a 12 percentage point higher immigrant share in 1990 (about one standard deviation) is associated with a 0.136 unit higher score in economic freedom in 2011 (about 1/7
II. Res
th of a standard deviation). The impact of OECD and non-OECD immigrant shares was positive, though the coefficient was significant only for non-OECD immigrants.
Regressions 3-12 in Table 2 We also find that a 12 percentage point higher immigrant share in 1990 is associated with a 0.313 higher score in Area 2, Legal Structure and Property Rights, in 2011 (Regression 5). This is some indication at least that, even if ethnic fragmentation results in less government spending on some public goods, it doesn't undermine the existence of the public goods of property rights and rule of law.
Finally, we also find that that a 12 percentage point higher immigrant share in 1990
is associated with a 0.230 higher score in Area 5, Regulation of Credit, Labor, and Business, in 2011 (Regression 12). We are not aware of any prior literature predicting either an increase or a decrease in regulation in response to immigration. However, the evidence does dissuade us of two potential fears of immigration. Immigrants do not appear to bring a desire with them for the highly regulated environment from which they often emigrate.
Nor do the native born respond to greater immigration by implementing a more stringent Table 4 and Table 5 . with the data at hand whether any changes in institutional quality are a function of the immigrants themselves or the reactions of the natives to the immigrants.
Overall, we find evidence that greater immigrant shares in the population yield positive impacts on institutional quality at the national level and negative impacts at the subnational level. The magnitude of the former appears to be larger than the latter and in either case the impact of immigrants on institutional quality is small. Statistics Canada. Place of birth for the immigrant population by period of immigration, 2006 counts and percentage distribution, for Canada, provinces and territories -20% ample data," http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/dp-pd/hlt/97-57/T404-eng. 1990-2011 1990-2011 1990-2011 1990-2011 -- 
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